‘Insider’ Threat with Deepfakes

I have been neglecting this blog recently as finishing off my master’s thesis (now done, passed and everything), working on various tasks in a new role, and finishing off a contributed book chapter have been priorities. With two of those three taken care of I am hoping to have time to write a bit more on here again.

In that spirit, and as nice piece of synergy with the book chapter, a quick word about an incident reported today. I predict it will be the first of many.

Impersonation of senior executives via e-mail has become a well-established, and profitable, practice among both organised and disorganised cyber criminals. Some of the most advanced attempts go to extreme lengths of surveillance and co-ordination. Even the most basic mass attempts have seen some success. Whether to include this as insider threat is more a philosophical debate than one where we can draw a clear line, but I choose to include it.

With the advent of Deepfake algorithms it was inevitable that impersonation would go beyond email. Deepfake pornography created for blackmail or revenge purposes appeared shortly after the technology became available. Using it for impersonation has mainly been for entertainment purposes, until recently. As far as I know, this is the first published case outside of fiction of an attacker going this far in impersonation. That they did not think to spoof the source phone number, leading to early detection, is surprising.

There are possible solutions to this. Since we have yet to effectively solve the problem of impersonation by changing only the display name on e-mails I suspect they are a long way from widespread adoption.

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